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Abstract 
 
Previous research has directly studied whether on-line retailing is more 
competitive than conventional retail markets.  The evidence from books and 
music CDs is mixed.  Here, I use an indirect approach to compare the 
competitiveness of on-line with conventional markets.  Focusing on the retail 
market for books, I identify a peculiarity in the pricing of bestsellers relative to 
other titles.  Supposing that competitive barriers are lower in on-line retailing, I 
analyze how the lower barriers would affect the relative pricing of bestsellers.  
The empirical data indicates that on-line retailing is more competitive than 
conventional retailing. 
 
                                          
* Dean and Professor, School of Computing, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, 
Singapore 117543, Singapore.  Tel: (65) 874-6807, http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~ipng/.  I 
gratefully acknowledge discussions with Tom Lee and Haim Mendelson and the research 
assistance of Cui Yan and Gerald Painkras. 
© 2000, I.P.L. Png 2 
1. Introduction 
 
Pricing is a key issue in both conventional and on-line retail channels.  Indeed, 
pricing may be the most important differentiator between the two channels.  On-
line retailers are claimed to enjoy lower costs than their bricks-and-mortar 
counterparts, and hence can offer lower prices.   Business Week columnist 
Robert Kuttner asserted that the Internet would reduce markets to the 
economist’s model of perfect competition: 
“The Internet is a nearly perfect market because information is 
instantaneous and buyers can compare the offerings of sellers worldwide.  
The result is fierce price competition, dwindling product differentiation, 
and vanishing brand loyalty.”1   
 
 Superficially, however, on-line markets appear to be much less 
competitive than conventional markets.  In book retailing, the largest chain 
Barnes and Noble has less than a 30% share of the conventional market.  By 
contrast, the largest on-line retailer Amazon has over 70% of the on-line market. 
 
Considerable work has focused on comparing prices in on-line channels 
with those in conventional stores.  Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) found that on-
line retailers of books and music CDs set prices that were 9-16% lower than 
conventional retailers, and that on-line retailers made price adjustments that 
were up to 100 times smaller than those of conventional stores. 
 
Other evidence on the degree of competition in on-line retailing, however, 
is not clear.   On-line retailers of books and music CDs do not always exhibit 
lower dispersion of prices than their conventional counterparts (Smith, Bailey, 
and Brynjolfsson (1999)).  Ho, Lu, and Tang (2000) found that on-line branches 
of conventional bookstores set higher prices and changed prices less frequently 
than purely on-line book retailers. 
  
 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) directly compared prices at on-line and 
conventional stores.   The conclusions from direct comparisons, however, are 
subject to significant limitations.  For instance, calculation of the full cost of a 
book to a buyer requires assumptions about the cost of the time incurred in 
traveling to and from conventional stores, and the shipment charges incurred by 
those shopping at on-line retailers.  Further, the direct price comparison ignores 
differences in the benefits provided by conventional as compared with on-line 
retailers.  A conventional bookstore provides a place for like-minded people to 
                                          
1  Robert Kuttner, “The Net: A Market Too Perfect for Profits”, Business Week, May 11, 1998, 
page 20. 
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meet and socialize, while an on-line retailer may be more convenient for people 
sending books as gifts.2 
 
Moreover, a direct price comparison doesn’t necessarily address the 
degree of competition: on-line retailers may set lower prices, but, owing to lower 
costs, they may enjoy higher margins.  It is margins, and not prices per se, that 
reflect the degree of competition.  The evidence on price dispersion is also not 
conclusive.  Low dispersion of prices among competing retailers is consistent 
with both perfect competition as well as a very effective price cartel.   
 
Further, an on-line channel may increase the accessibility of not only 
information about price, but also information about other product attributes (Alba 
et.al. (1997), Bakos (1997), Ariely and Lynch (2000)).  To the extent that on-line 
retailing provides relatively better access to information about non-price 
attributes, buyers may be less price-sensitive and hence, prices will be higher. 
 
 
In this paper, I use an indirect approach to measure the degree of competition in 
on-line markets.   Like previous scholars, I focus on the retailing of books.  
Amazon was the first major success in on-line retailing.  Presumably, business 
practices in on-line retailing are relatively more established in books as compared 
with other categories.  This suggests that on-line retailing of books will be more 
amenable to systematic study.  Another possible category for study is music CDs, 
which was the second major success in on-line retailing.  
 
The indirect approach emphasizes the underlying determinants of 
competition rather than prices as such.  Specifically, I focus on the pricing of 
bestsellers relative to other titles, and consider how changes in competitive 
conditions would affect the relative pricing of bestsellers to other titles.  By 
focusing on relative pricing within a market (either conventional or on-line), I 
control for traveling cost and shipment charges, and differences in the relative 
benefits provided by conventional and on-line retailers, and in their costs.   
 
Theoretical analysis shows that, in a market with lower competitive 
barriers, the pricing of bestsellers will be relatively closer to that of other titles.  A 
major reason is that, if competitive barriers are lower, bestsellers are less 
effective as loss leaders, hence retailers will not discount bestsellers to the same 
extent as when competitive barriers are high.  In the case of hard cover titles, 
my empirical tests show that on-line book retailers indeed price bestsellers 
relatively closer to other titles than conventional bookstores.  This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that on-line retailing is more competitive than conventional 
                                          
2  At the wholesale level, McKeown, Watson, and Zinkhan (2000) find that car dealers pay more 
at on-line than conventional auctions.  The price difference is consistent with differences in 
benefits provided by the two channels. 
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retailing.   The results for paperbacks, however, are not consistent with the 
hypothesis. 
 
 
2.  Conventional Bookstores: Retail Pricing  
 
Table 1 reports the sales, number of stores, and average store sizes of the six 
largest conventional bookstore chains -- Barnes & Noble, Borders, Waldenbooks 
(owned by Borders), B. Dalton (owned by Barnes & Noble), Books-a-Million, and 
Crown. 
  
-- Table 1 here -- 
 
Books differ from many other goods in that they are marked with a list 
price at the point of manufacture.  Bookstores set prices not in absolute dollar 
terms, but rather in terms of discounts from list price.3  In common with other 
retailers, bookstores engage in a variety of pricing strategies, including loyalty 
programs, coupons, and clearance sales.   
 
Bookstores stand out from other retailers in one respect.  They 
systematically charge lower prices for their most popular items.   Specifically, 
bookstores offer larger discounts on current bestsellers than titles not on the 
bestseller list.    
 
Referring to Table 2, Barnes & Noble offers a 40% discount on all titles on 
its bestseller list, but no discount on most other titles.  The difference in discount 
is 40%.  Borders engages in a similar pricing policy: it offers a 30% discount on 
the top 20 bestsellers and other selected titles, and no discounts on most other 
titles.   
 
-- Table 2 here -- 
 
The pricing strategy of smaller chains and independent bookstores is quite 
different.  Generally, they offer much smaller discounts, if any, on bestsellers.  
For instance, Majerek’s is a small Indiana chain that sells books and cards.  It 
does not offer discounts on any book. 
 
 
On first impression, it seems odd for a bookstore to offer larger discounts for 
bestsellers than other titles.  Since bestsellers are in the hottest demand, 
bookstores should be able to extract relatively higher margins.  In the 
                                          
3  Brynolfsson and Smith (2000) compare the absolute prices of books in conventional and on-line 
channels.  It would have been more appropriate to compare the discounts. 
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conventional microeconomic models of both perfect competition and monopoly, 
when demand is higher, the price will be higher.4  
 
 The most obvious explanation of the discrepancy in the pricing of 
bestsellers and other titles is that the wholesale cost to retailers of bestsellers is 
lower.  The industry practice is for publishers and wholesalers to set prices to 
retailers in terms of a discount from the list price.  Table 2 shows typical 
wholesale discounts as reported by an industry source.   
 
The difference in wholesale discount between bestsellers and other hard 
cover titles ranges from 15-30%.  This can account for only a part of the 
discrepancy in retail discount between bestsellers and other hard cover titles at 
Barnes & Noble and Borders.   
 
It is possible that bookstores benefit from larger volume discounts on 
bestsellers.  This would make bestsellers relatively cheaper and account for the 
greater discount on bestsellers.  This, however, cannot explain the difference in 
the relative pricing of bestsellers to other titles at Barnes & Noble as compared 
with B. Dalton.  Both chains belong to the same parent group, and hence their 
wholesale costs should be identical.  The same disparity arises at Borders and 
Waldenbooks, which have the same parent.5   
 
 
Recent research into variations in retail pricing over time may help to explain 
why bookstores systematically discount bestsellers.  Warner and Barsky (1995) 
found that retailers of many consumer products systematically reduced prices at 
weekends and on holidays, when demand was expected to be highest.  
MacDonald (2000) found that retailers of seasonal food items such as barbeque 
items, ice cream, and canned yams systematically cut prices at the peaks of 
seasonal demand. 
 
The preceding observations contradict the standard demand-supply 
model, in which demand increases result in higher (not lower) prices.  There is a 
close parallel between the variations of pricing over seasons and 
weekends/holidays and the pricing of bestsellers vis-à-vis non-bestsellers.  The 
demand for bestsellers is higher than that for other titles, hence this demand is 
like the peak demand for seasonal items and weekend/holiday demand for 
                                          
4  The demand for new books is inherently uncertain.  The practice of discounting bestsellers also 
contradicts the general retail policy of managing uncertain demand by setting a high initial price 
and marking down if demand is low (Lazear (1986), Pashigian and Bowen (1991), and Png 
(1991)).    
5  Other important features of wholesale distribution of books include returns policies, cooperative 
advertising, slotting allowances, and credit terms.      
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general consumer products.  Just as Warner and Barsky (1995) and MacDonald 
(2000) found that retailers cut prices when demand was high, we have observed 
bookstores cutting prices for the items in highest demand. 
 
 Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) present four possible explanations for 
the puzzling behavior observed by Warner and Barsky (1995) and others.  These 
theories can be adapted to explain the retail pricing of bestsellers vis-à-vis other 
titles. 
 
A.  Increased Supply.  A store incurs some costs in carrying a title that are fixed 
in the sense that they are unrelated to the sales volume of the title.  These 
include minimum shelf space and shelving labor, cost of inventory, and 
database entries.  A store will sell a relatively larger volume of bestsellers as 
compared with other titles, hence its average cost of supplying bestsellers is 
relatively lower.  Accordingly, in the long run, there will be relatively more 
retailers of bestsellers.  This explanation is quite consistent with casual 
observation: gas stations, convenience stores, and supermarkets sell 
bestsellers, especially paperbacks, but not other slower-moving titles.  Since 
the supply of bestsellers is larger, it is possible that, despite the higher 
demand, the price will be lower.  This Increased Supply effect should be 
especially strong for bestselling paperbacks. 
 
B.  Loss Leader (Switching Costs).  Bookstores may use the bestseller list as a 
loss leader to attract customers.  Owing to the publicity surrounding the 
bestseller list, book buyers pay relatively more attention to titles on the list.  
Bookstores exploit this attention by setting relatively lower prices.  Once 
buyers are in the store, they may be attracted to buy other titles, which are 
priced relatively higher.  Although they know that these other titles are 
relatively more expensive, the cost (in time and money) of traveling to 
another store deters them from buying elsewhere.   
 
The Loss Leader theory applies more strongly to large bookstores, as they 
have more titles with which to exploit customers attracted by bestsellers.  It 
can explain why Barnes & Noble discounts bestsellers much more heavily 
than B. Dalton, although both belong to the same group, and the similar 
disparity between Borders and Waldenbooks.  Referring to Table 1, Barnes & 
Noble and Borders stores are about 6 times larger than B. Dalton and 
Waldenbooks stores.  Accordingly, the effectiveness of loss leaders is much 
greater at Barnes & Noble and Borders stores. 
 
C.  Differential Price Elasticity.  Bils (1989) theorized that peaks in demand draw 
a relatively large proportion of new customers, who are relatively more 
sensitive to price.  Applied to the case of books, the theory would be that the 
bestseller list attracts people who do not regularly buy books, for instance, 
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those who see the movie and are then attracted to buy the book.  These 
customers are more relatively price-sensitive than those who buy a broader 
selection of titles, hence, bookstores would rationally offer larger discounts 
(lower prices) on bestsellers.   
 
Another reason for differential price elasticity is that the cost of switching 
stores is relatively higher for non-bestsellers.  It is relatively more difficult for 
a customer to locate a non-bestseller in the shelves, and, there is a greater 
risk of a non-bestseller being out of stock.  Accordingly, someone who has 
browsed a store and found a non-bestseller that she likes is less likely to 
switch to another store.  Thus, bookstores would offer smaller discounts 
(higher prices) on non-bestsellers.  The Differential Price Elasticity theory 
applies more strongly to large stores, as they have larger stocks of non-
bestsellers.  The theory is consistent with Barnes & Noble and Borders 
discounting bestsellers much more heavily than B. Dalton and Waldenbooks.   
 
D.  Tacit Collusion.  Suppose that the various competing sellers in an industry 
engage in tacit collusion to maintain price above the competitive level.  For 
the collusion to succeed, each seller must not find it worthwhile to cheat on 
the tacit cartel by cutting price to draw additional business.  The disciplinary 
mechanism is that the others will retaliate and bring down the price to an 
even lower level, and hence cutting profits for all sellers.  Since the demand 
for bestsellers is relatively high, the temptation for a bookstore to cut the 
price of bestsellers is relatively greater.  One way to ensure stability of the 
tacit cartel is to set a relatively lower price for bestsellers.  
 
To varying degrees, theories A-C probably apply to conventional book retailing.  
The Tacit Collusion theory (D), however, seems improbable.  Retail prices are 
very transparent and easy to adjust.  If the major bookstore chains were tacitly 
colluding, and one were to cheat on the cartel, its lower prices would be quickly 
observed and the competitors could respond with similar or larger discounts very 
quickly.6  Table 3 summarizes the applicability of these theories to the pricing of 
bestsellers relative to non-bestsellers in conventional bookstores. 
 
-- Table 3 here – 
 
 
3. Conventional vis-a-vis On-line Pricing 
 
                                          
6  In fact, as I discuss below, the major bookstores base their discounts on different bestseller 
lists.  If competing bookstore chains were indeed tacitly colluding, they would focus on the same 
bestseller list, in order to avoid misunderstanding.  The fact that they base discounts on different 
lists is further evidence against the Tacit Collusion theory. 
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On-line retailers face the same issue as conventional bookstores – how to price 
bestsellers relative to non-bestsellers?   I now consider the extent to which the 
various theories A-D apply to the pricing of books sold by on-line retailers.  It is 
important to stress that, realistically, the on-line retailers do not necessarily form 
a separate market.  Rather, they compete amongst one another as well as with 
conventional bookstores.  
 
A.  Increased Supply.  On-line retailers do not incur many of the fixed costs 
(unrelated to the sales volume of the title) associated with physical retailing.  
Hence, the average cost to on-line retailers of supplying non-bestseller titles 
should be much closer to the average cost of supplying bestsellers.  
Accordingly, the on-line supply of bestsellers should not be so much larger 
than the supply of other titles.  However, the on-line book market is 
integrated with the conventional market.  The on-line supply is a very small 
fraction of the total (conventional plus on-line) supply.  Hence, the addition of 
the on-line supply will have relatively little impact on the overall markets for 
bestsellers and other titles.  In particular, the relative pricing of bestsellers to 
other titles will be driven by the conventional bookstores.   
 
B.  Loss Leader.  Can a customer who is visiting an on-line bookstore switch 
relatively more easily to a competing store than a customer in a conventional 
bookstore?   Certainly, the time, effort, and money required to switch from 
one on-line bookstore to another is lower than to switch between 
conventional bookstores.  However, shipment charges are a slight 
countervailing factor: most on-line bookstores levy a shipment charge that 
favors larger purchases.  On balance, I contend that buyer switching costs 
are lower among on-line than conventional bookstores.  Hence, on-line 
bookstores would draw less advantage from loss leaders, and therefore, 
should not discount bestsellers so heavily relative to other titles.  
Equivalently, in on-line bookstores, the difference in discount between 
bestsellers and other titles should be smaller than in conventional stores. 
 
C.  Differential Price Elasticity.  Differential price elasticity arises from new buyers 
being relatively more price-sensitive and searching for non-bestseller titles 
being relatively more difficult than searching for bestsellers. There is no 
reason to think that new buyers attracted to on-line bookstores are less price-
sensitive relative to existing customers of on-line stores.  Accordingly, this 
explanation applies to both retail channels.  As observed by Alba et.al. 
(1997), Bakos (1997), Ariely and Lynch (2000), the on-line channel may 
increase the accessibility of information about other product attributes.  
Specifically, in the on-line channel, it is equally easy to locate non-bestsellers 
and bestsellers.  Hence, in on-line retailing, the price of non-bestsellers 
should be relatively closer to that of bestsellers, meaning that their discounts 
should be closer. 
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D.  Tacit Collusion.  The prices of books sold on-line are even more transparent 
than the prices in conventional bookstores.  An on-line retailer could employ 
an automated system to monitor the prices of its competitors.  Further, on-
line prices can be adjusted instantaneously.  Indeed, in May 1999, when 
Amazon increased its discount on bestsellers to 50% from 40%, its 
competitors, bn.com and Borders.com, responded within hours.  Accordingly, 
the risk of defection from a tacit cartel will be very slight.  Hence, it is very 
unlikely that the Tacit Collusion theory applies to the pricing of books sold 
through the Internet. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the theoretical applicability of Theories A-D to 
conventional and on-line retailing of books, and motivates the following 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis:  The difference in discount between bestsellers and other titles 
should be smaller in on-line than conventional bookstores. 
 
-- Table 4 here – 
 
As reported in Table 4, the on-line book retailers are much smaller in terms of 
sales than the conventional stores.   The three far and away largest on-line 
booksellers are Amazon, bn.com, and Borders.com.  Accordingly, I focus on their 
pricing.  Referring to Table 5, all three offered 50% discounts on hard cover 
bestsellers as compared with a 30% discount on other hard cover titles.  
Accordingly, the difference in discount was 20%.  By contrast, referring to Table 
2 for the three largest conventional stores, the difference in discount was 40% at 
Barnes & Noble, 30% at Borders, and 25% at Waldenbooks.  Clearly, the 
difference in discount was smaller among the on-line booksellers.  
 
-- Table 5 here -- 
 
Referring to Table 5, the top three on-line booksellers offered 50% 
discounts on paperback bestsellers as compared with a 20% discount on other 
paperback titles.  Accordingly, the difference in discount was 30%.7  Referring to 
Table 2 for the three largest conventional stores, the difference in discount was 
30% at Barnes & Noble, 30% at Borders, and 15% at Waldenbooks.  Apparently, 
the difference in discount was not significantly smaller among the on-line 
booksellers.  
 
 
                                          
7  Fatbrain, the fourth largest on-line bookseller, focuses on computer- and business-related 
titles.  It also carries fiction and general non-fiction, but with a different discount policy from 
those the top three. 
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There is a major problem with the direct comparison of the discount policies of 
conventional relative to on-line book retailers.  It is that conventional bookstores 
use different bestseller lists, and some do not discount all of the titles on their 
(own) bestseller list.8  By contrast, the five largest on-line retailers all base 
discounts on the list published every Sunday by the New York Times.   
 
 To take account of this disparity, the actual discounts set by the 
bookstores for forty titles were collected from five of the six largest conventional 
bookstore chains (Barnes & Noble, Borders, Waldenbooks, B. Dalton, and Crown) 
and the four largest on-line booksellers (Amazon, bn.com, Borders.com, and 
Fatbrain).  Twenty titles consisted of the top five titles in the New York Times 
bestseller lists for hard cover fiction and non-fiction and paperback fiction and 
non-fiction as published on Sunday, June 18, 2000.  To represent titles that were 
not bestsellers, the other twenty titles consisted of the top five in the same 
headings published in the week of June 20, 1999 (excluding those titles that 
were among the June 18, 2000 bestsellers). 
 
 I then tested the Hypothesis using ordinary least squares.  The dependent 
variable was the retailer’s discount from the list price, while the independent 
variables included indicators for the title being a (current) bestseller (BEST), the 
retailer being conventional (CONV), and the retailer being on-line (ONLINE), the 
average size if the retailer was a conventional store (SIZE), and the number of 
categories if the retailer was on-line (CATS).   
 
 According to the theories A-D, the discount on a bestseller should be 
higher than that on other titles, hence the coefficient of BEST should be positive.  
Generally, on-line retailers incur lower costs than conventional stores, hence the 
coefficient of ONLINE should be positive.   
 
 The effects of the independent variables, SIZE and CATS, are more subtle.  
As explained earlier, the impact of the Loss Leader and Differential Price 
Elasticity theories (B and C) depends on the size of the store.  For a larger store, 
the use of loss leaders will be more effective, and the difference in the cost of 
searching for bestsellers as compared with other titles will be greater.  
Accordingly, the discount for bestsellers should be higher in larger conventional 
stores.   Similarly, the bestseller discount should be higher in on-line retailers 
that carry more distinct product categories. 
 
-- Table 6 here -- 
 
                                          
8  At one time, all of the conventional stores used the New York Times bestseller list.  In 
September 1999, Barnes & Noble switched to its own bestseller list.  By June 2000, among the 
major chains, only Crown used the New York Times bestseller list.  
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Table 6 reports the results for hard cover titles (columns (i) – (iii)) and 
paperbacks (columns (iv) – (vi)).  Referring to regressions (i) and (ii) for hard 
cover titles, it might seem that the dummy variables ONLINE*CATS (number of 
categories for title carried by on-line retailer) and CONV*SIZE (average store size 
for title carried by a conventional bookstore) were significant.  However, 
regression (iii) indicates that store size actually works through the pricing of 
bestsellers.  When the variables BEST*ONLINE*CAT and BEST*CONV*SIZE are 
included, the unmoderated variables ONLINE*CAT and CONV*SIZE cease to be 
significant. 
 
Accordingly, I focus on regression (iii).  Other things equal, the discount 
on hard cover bestsellers was 6.5 percentage points higher than that on non-
bestsellers, and on-line retailers gave a 31.8 percentage points higher discount 
than conventional bookstores.  Consistent with the Loss Leader and Differential 
Price Elasticity theories, the bestseller discount in a conventional store increased 
with store size (coefficient of BEST*CONV*SIZE was positive and significant) and 
the bestseller discount at an on-line retailer increased with the number of 
categories (coefficient of BEST*ONLINE*CATS was positive and significant). 
 
Referring to Table 3, the Loss Leader and Differential Price Elasticity 
theories provide the clearest distinction between relative pricing of bestsellers at 
on-line vis-à-vis conventional retailers.  Since the two theories apply to large 
stores, I compare the relative pricing of bestsellers at two largest superstore 
chains (Barnes & Noble and Borders) and the two largest on-line retailers 
(Amazon and bn.com).  
 
The sales-weighted average size of Barnes & Noble and Borders is 24,850 
sq.ft., while the sales-weighted average number of categories for Amazon and 
bn.com is 12.4.   Using the coefficients from regression (iii), I calculate that, at 
the large conventional stores, the difference in discount between bestseller and 
other titles was 0.76 x 24.85 = 18.88%, while the difference at the large on-line 
retailers was 1.2 x 12.4 = 14.88%.  The 4.0% difference is significant when 
compared with the average bestseller discount of 6.5%.   
 
The empirical results for paperbacks were quite similar to those for hard 
cover titles.  There was one major difference: the variable BEST*ONLINE, 
representing bestseller titles sold through on-line retailers remained positive and 
significant, even with the inclusion of the variable BEST*ONLINE*CATS, 
representing the relation between the bestseller discount and the number of 
categories carried by the on-line retailer.  
 
 On average, the difference in bestseller discount between the two 
superstore chains and the two biggest on-line stores was 0.89 x 24.85 - 10.8 - 
1.3 x 12.43 = -4.8%.   
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 The results for hard cover titles are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
degree of competition is significantly higher in on-line retailing – owing to lower 
buyer switching costs and search costs.  However, the results for paperbacks are 
not. 
 
 
4.  Limitations 
 
Theories A-D quite comprehensively cover four possible economic explanations 
of discrepancies in pricing between bestsellers and other titles.  What are other 
possible explanations?  One is that the difference in discounts policy arises from 
systematic differences in the customer populations of conventional and on-line 
book retailers.  These systematic differences might affect the applicability of the 
Loss Leader and Differential Price Elasticity theories. 
 
Degeratu et.al.’s (2000) study of grocery retailing found that on-line 
shoppers were younger and better educated than those in conventional stores.  
These observations are consistent with computer users being younger and better 
educated than the general population.  Degeratu et.al also found that on-line 
shoppers were more likely to have children and had a higher household income 
than those in conventional stores.  These observations are consistent with on-
line shopping providing convenience and saving of time.   
 
How would the customer populations of conventional bookstores differ 
from those of on-line retailers?  Surely, on-line shoppers will be relatively 
younger and better educated.  However, it is hard to say how these differences 
would affect the applicability of the Loss Leader and Differential Price Elasticity 
theories.   
 
Whether on-line book shoppers are more likely to have children and have 
a higher household income than those who shop in conventional bookstores is an 
empirical question.  To the extent that there are such differences, on-line 
shoppers will have a higher opportunity cost of time, and should be more 
vulnerable to the use of bestsellers as loss leaders for bait-and-switch and should 
be relatively insensitive to the price of non-bestseller titles.  Accordingly, these 
differences tend to bias actual discounts policy against my Hypothesis. 
 
One obvious difference between the customers of the two channels is that 
on-line book shoppers probably live further away from major metropolitan areas, 
and some will be in foreign countries.  It is hard to say how these differences 
would affect the applicability of the Loss Leader and Differential Price Elasticity 
theories.   
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To summarize, systematic differences between the customer populations 
of conventional and on-line book retailers might affect the applicability of the 
Loss Leader and Differential Price Elasticity theories.  In future research, it would 
be desirable to control for these differences in analyzing the pricing of bestsellers 
relative to other titles. 
 
 
An alternative explanation of the disparity between conventional and on-line 
retailers in the pricing of bestsellers relative to other titles proceeds from a 
behavioral hypothesis.  Amazon is the far away industry leader in on-line retailing 
of books.  Suppose that Amazon has (arbitrarily) decided a policy of 50% 
discount on bestsellers and 30% discount on other hard cover titles and 20% 
discount on other paperbacks.  Suppose, further, that Amazon exercises price 
leadership over the other, smaller on-line retailers.  Then, their discount policies 
would follow those of Amazon.    
 
In future research, this behavioral hypothesis could be tested with 
observations of the pattern of pricing over time.   Amazon’s market share is 
diminishing over time, with the entry of bn.com, Borders.com, and other 
competitors.  Accordingly, its power to exercise price leadership should also be 
diminishing.  Hence, under the behavioral hypothesis, the discounts offered by 
competing on-line retailers should diverge over time.  By contrast, this 
divergence would not arise under my hypothesis that on-line retailing is indeed 
more competitive than conventional retailing. 
 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, I have exploited a systematic difference in the pricing of 
bestsellers relative to other titles.  Theoretical analysis shows that, in a market 
with lower competitive barriers, the pricing of bestsellers will be relatively closer 
to that of other titles.  Simple empirical evidence from conventional and on-line 
bookstores is consistent with the hypothesis that on-line retailing is more 
competitive for hard cover titles but not paperbacks. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that, by focusing on relative pricing within a 
market (either conventional or on-line), I control for traveling cost and shipment 
charges, and differences in the relative benefits provided by conventional and 
on-line retailers, and in their costs.  Accordingly, my analysis provides a clearer 
answer to the question of whether on-line markets are more competitive than 
conventional markets.   
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Borders, the second-largest conventional retailer of books, and Amazon, the 
largest on-line retailer, sell music CDs as well as books.  The demand for music 
CDs also varies between bestsellers (“top of the charts”) and other titles.  Given 
the practice of discounting bestsellers relative to other titles in retailing of books, 
it might be expected that music retailers would engage in a similar behavior. 
 
In fact, however, both conventional and on-line music retailers appear to 
set similar prices for bestsellers and other titles.  This difference between the 
pricing of books and music CDs might be explained by a systematic policy of the 
leading music publishers to discourage discounting.  Until recently, the five 
leading music publishers maintained “Minimum Advertised Price” programs, 
under which the publishers withheld cooperative advertising payments from any 
retailer that advertised prices below the stipulated minimum.  These programs 
effectively discouraged retailers from discounting music CDs.   
 
In May 2000, the five leading music publishers agreed with the Federal 
Trade Commission to disband their “Minimum Advertised Price” programs.  It 
would be interesting to observe whether music retailers will follow retailers of 
books to discount bestsellers.  
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Table 1:  Conventional Bookstores 
 
 Barnes & 
Noble 
Borders Waldenbooks 
(Borders) 
A.  Dalton 
(B&N) 
Books-a-
million 
Crown 
1999 sales (US$ 
million)  
 
$2,822 
 
$1,914 
 
$981 
 
$426 
 
$ 404* 
 
185 
Number of stores, 
Dec. 1999  
 
542 
 
300 
 
904 
 
400 
 
180 
 
92 
Average store 
size, Dec. 1999 
(‘000 sq.ft.) 
 
23.4 
 
27 
 
3.9 
 
4 
 
4, 20** 
 
n.a. 
*   Includes on-line sales through Web site. 
**  Over 120 are Books-a-million stores with average size of 20,000 sq.ft., while fewer than 
60 are Bookland stores with 4,000 sq.ft. average size. 
Sources:  “Chain Sales Rose 11% in Fiscal ’00 to $6.8 Billion”, Publishers Weekly, Vol. 247 No. 13 (March 27, 2000), page 13; 
Company 10-Ks, press releases and web pages. 
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Table 2:  Conventional Bookstore Discounts 
 
 Barnes & 
Noble 
Borders Walden-
books 
(Borders) 
B.Dalton 
(B&N) 
Books-a-
million 
Crown Wholesale 
Hard cover 
bestsellers 
 
40% 
 
30% 
 
25%* 
 
15-25%* 
 
40%** 
 
40% 
 
45-50% 
Paperback 
bestsellers 
 
30% 
 
30% 
 
15%* 
 
0%* 
 
25%** 
 
30% 
 
30-35% 
Selected 
featured titles 
  
30% 
    
25% 
 
n.a. 
Other hard cover 
titles 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0%* 
 
0%* 
 
10%** 
 
10% 
 
20-30% 
Other paper- 
back titles 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0%* 
 
0%* 
 
10%** 
 
10% 
around 
20% 
* Additional 10% discount available with $10 membership card. 
** Only with $5 membership card. 
Sources: Publishers Weekly Library; Visits/calls to stores; Company 10Ks and press releases. 
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Table 3:  Theories 
 
 Theory Explains difference in discount 
between bestsellers and other titles 
at conventional bookstores 
Difference in discount between 
bestsellers and other titles at on-line 
bookstores 
A. Increased 
Supply 
yes slightly smaller than in conventional 
bookstores 
B. Loss Leader yes significantly smaller than in 
conventional bookstores 
C. Differential 
Price Elasticity 
yes significantly smaller than in 
conventional bookstores 
D. Tacit Collusion perhaps not applicable 
 
 
 
Table 4: On-line Bookstores 
 
 Amazon bn.com borders.com Fatbrain 
1999 sales  
(US$ million) 
 
$ 800 
 
$ 202 
 
$  18 
 
n.a. 
No. of visitors, 
Dec. 1999 (million) 
 
15.8 
 
5.9 
 
0.86 
 
0.26 
No. of product categories 
(including books), June 2000 
 
14 
 
7 
 
4 
 
1 
 
Sources:  “Chain Sales Rose 11% in Fiscal ’00 to $6.8 Billion”, Publishers Weekly, Vol. 247 No. 13 (March 27, 2000), page 13; 
Company press releases; Karen J Bannan, “Book battle”, Mediaweek, Vol. 10 No. 9 (February 28, 2000), pp. 72-76. 
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Table 5:  On-line Bookstore Discounts 
 
 Amazon bn.com Borders.com Fatbrain 
Hard cover bestsellers 50% 50% 50% 30% 
Paperback bestsellers 50% 50% 50% 20% 
Other hard cover titles 30% 30% 30% 30% 
Other paperback titles 20%  20% 20% 20-30% 
Sources: Retailer web-sites. 
Notes: Bn.com and Borders.com state their official pricing policy as being to offer discounts of up to 30% on non-bestseller hard 
cover books and up to 20% on non-bestseller paperbacks.  A check of 20 non-bestseller hard cover and 20 non-bestseller paperback 
titles indicated that they follow Amazon’s pricing exactly, with discounts of 30% and 20% respectively.  Fatbrain did not declare a 
pricing policy for bestsellers.  The discounts reported in Table 5 are based on the same sample of 20 non-bestseller hard cover and 
20 non-bestseller paperback titles in addition to 20 non-bestseller hard cover and 20 non-bestseller paperback titles. 
 
© 2000, I.P.L. Png 20 
Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions 
 
Dependent variable: DISCOUNT  
 
Independent 
variable 
 
(i) 
Hard 
cover 
(ii) 
Hard  
cover 
(iii) 
Hard 
cover 
(iv) 
Paperback 
(v) 
Paperback 
(vi) 
Paperback 
CONSTANT 
 
 
-0.062*** 
(0.022) 
0.000 
(0.027) 
0.000 
(0.026) 
-0.069*** 
(0.023) 
0.000 
(0.028) 
0.000 
(0.027) 
BEST 
 
 
0.176*** 
(0.022) 
 
0.065* 
(0.036) 
0.065* 
(0.035) 
0.116*** 
(0.024) 
-0.014 
(0.038) 
 
-0.014 
(0.037) 
ONLINE 
 
 
0.341*** 
(0.029) 
 
0.279*** 
(0.032) 
0.318*** 
(0.034) 
0.313*** 
(0.031) 
0.245*** 
(0.034) 
0.286*** 
(0.035) 
BEST* 
ONLINE 
 
-0.032 
(0.029) 
0.079* 
(0.040) 
0.0087 
(0.046) 
0.056* 
(0.032) 
0.186*** 
(0.043) 
0.108** 
(0.049) 
ONLINE* 
CATS 
 
0.0054** 
(0.002) 
0.0054*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0014 
(0.003) 
0.0022 
(0.002) 
0.0022 
(0.002) 
-0.0048 
(0.003) 
CONV*SIZE 
 
 
0.0042*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.0047*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
BEST*CONV*
SIZE 
 
 0.0076*** 
(0.002) 
0.0076*** 
(0.002) 
 0.0089*** 
(0.002) 
0.0089*** 
(0.002) 
BEST* 
ONLINE* 
CATS 
  0.012*** 
(0.004) 
  0.013*** 
(0.004) 
No. of 
observations 
 
161 
 
161 
 
161 
 
170 
 
170 
 
170 
 
R-squared 
 
0.776 
 
0.795 
 
0.807 
 
0.727 
 
0.755 
 
0.768 
 
F-statistic 
 
107.8 
 
100.4 
 
91.74 
 
88.08 
 
84.03 
 
77.19 
 
 
